Volume 4
Issue 2 Spring 1964
Spring 1964

The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol Agreement
Derrick W. R. Sewell

Recommended Citation
Derrick W. Sewell, The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol Agreement, 4 Nat. Resources J. 309 (1964).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol4/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AND
PROTOCOL AGREEMENT
W. R. DERRICK SEWELL*
INTRODUCTION

Across the world today there are about seventy-five major international river basins. Some of them possess considerable hydroelectric potentials, and many of them could be harnessed to provide
irrigation, navigation, flood control, and other services. In many
instances their development might provide the key to economic
growth.' So far, however, very few international river basins have
been developed, and even where development has taken place it
generally has been limited in scale and in scope. In many cases the
utilization of the available resources has probably been far less than
it would have been had no boundary existed. The tendency is for the
countries sharing international river basins to develop alternatives
first, even though they may cost far more than the benefits that could
be obtained from a co-operative international venture.2
There are three broad types of international river development:
unilateral, exclusive, and unified. These reflect differing degrees of
international co-operation.
4. UnilateralDevelopment
In this type of development one nation may take the initiative
and develop its own part of the river. Sometimes this development
will affect the other country, but usually the effects are small, and
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1. The International River Basin, Proceedings of a United Nations Seminar on
the Development and Administration of the International River Basin, University of
British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia 1 (Chapman ed. 1963).
2. Scott, River Basins-NationalPawns or International Wealth, Paper presented
to the Vancouver Institute, January 6, 1962, p. 1.
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international agreements for compensation are fairly easily obtained. The works involved are generally located in the country
which uses them. International co-operation may be suspended, but
the effects are never so serious as to cause a national emergency.
Instances of unilateral international river development include
improvements on the Rhine, the Danube and the Nile Rivers. Most
of the problems dealt with by the Canadian-United States International Joint Commission 3 are in this unilateral category and relate to such matters as regulation of stream flows to prevent flooding
in one country from development in the other, or to prevent pollution in one country from waste disposal in the other, although the
International Joint Commission has other important functions also.
B. Exclusive Development
Competition for the use of the waters of an international stream
may be so great, or the problems of co-ordination of use so complex, that the only possible course of action is to divide the waters
between the countries sharing the river. The division of the Indus
River between India and Pakistan is perhaps the best example of
exclusive development. Another instance is the St. Lawrence River,
where the river is literally divided down the middle, with United
States powerhouses extending halfway across, and Canadian powerhouses located on the other half.
C. Unified Development
In the case of unified development, the countries involved decide
to develop the basin to its optimum extent, ignoring the existence
of the international boundary. This approach is based on the concept of integrated, basin-wide development. Its basic tenet is that
by recognizing the hydrologic unity of the basin in planning and
development much greater net benefits may be derived than with independent development of the separate parts of the basin. The
3. The International Joint Commission was established pursuant to the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States and Canada. The Commission
consists of three members from the United States and three from Canada. The basic
function of the Commission is to study disputes arising from the use of international
waters and to make recommendations to the two governments. To carry out these
responsibilities it has established various Boards to control water use. It also sets up
boards from time to time to investigate problems which are brought to its attention.
For a discussion of its work, see Bloomfield & Fitzgerald, Boundary Water Problems
of Canada and the United States (1958).
4. The river basin often provides a convenient unit for planning the development
of water resources, especially in those instances where the larger part of the popula-
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excess of benefits over what could have been achieved with independent development can then be shared between the participants.
The logical outcome of this approach is a division of labor between the various parts of the basin, as for example, storage in the
headwaters and generation downstream. For maximum advantage
to be derived, operations of the various facilities are centrally coordinated and integrated.
There are several examples of unilateral international river
development, and a few examples of exclusive development. So far,
however, there has been no instance of unified development. The
Columbia River offered great possibilities of being the first example
of unified development of an international river. Certainly, many
of the basic requirements for such an approach were there. Here
were two countries with similar political ideologies, a long history
of international co-operation, and considerable experience in river
development. Furthermore, there were growing demands for electric power on both sides of the border. Unfortunately, however,
the arrangements under the Columbia River Treaty fall short of the
ideal of unified river basin development.
I
ORIGINS OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY

The Columbia River Treaty is the end-product of a search for
upstream storage to regulate stream flows for power generation and
for flood damage reduction. The larger part of the head on the
United States' portion of the main stem of the Columbia River
has been developed; only the Ben Franklin project remains to be
constructed. Installed capacity on the main stem of the American
reach will total 9.8 million kilowatts when all projects now under
construction are completed. 5 Another 3 million kilowatts of capacity
are distributed on the Clark Fork-Pend Oreille and Snake Rivers.
(Figure 1)6
tion is concentrated in the basin, and where the services derived from the develop-

ment of the water resources are used within the basin. In other instances, however,
other regional units, either smaller or larger than the river basin, will be more appropriate for the development of water resources. For a discussion of this point, see
Fox & Craine, OrganizationalArrangements for Water Development, 2 Natural Resources J. 1 (1962).
5. Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty: an International Evaluation 6 (Resources for the Future, Inc., 1963).

6. Ibid.
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FIGURE 1
MAJOR PROJECTS PROPOSED AND CONSTRUCTED
ON THE COLUMBIA RIVER AND MAJOR
TRIBUTARIES

Optimum utilization of this capacity, and the development of
further capacity, hinges on the provision of upstream storage to
even out the seasonal and cyclical fluctuations of river flows. The
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United States Corps of Engineers has estimated that 27 million
acre-feet of storage are required for the "C" phase of power development.' So far, however, only 13 million acre-feet of storage
for power purposes have been developed. 8
In addition, there continues to be a threat of inundation from
major floods in the Columbia River Basin, especially in the lower
reaches of the river. The United States Corps of Engineers estimates that some 18 million acre-feet of storage are required to reduce the 1894 flood to 800,000 cubic feet per second at the Dalles.0
Only 2/3 of the required amount has been provided so far. Of the
13 million acre-feet of storage developed in the basin to date, only
10.5 million acre-feet are usable for flood control purposes.1 °
A number of major storage sites are still available in the United
States part of the basin, but development of some of the most
attractive ones is stalled by various conflicts of interest. Glacier
View, for example, is stalled because of opposition of parkland and
wildlife interests. Nez Perce was shelved because of conflicts between
the fishery interests and power interests." Attention has turned
therefore to possibilities in Canada.
,4.The InternationalJoint Commission Reference, 1944
In 1944 the United States and Canadian governments asked the
International Joint Commission to investigate the possibilities of
developing the Columbia River basin on a unified basis, ignoring
the international boundary. 2 The International Joint Commission
set up the International Columbia River Engineering Board, which
presented a report after 15 years of study. It outlined three alternative schemes of development which would make possible "The
maximum practicable utilization of the water resources of the
7. 1 U.S. Corps of Engineers, Columbia River Treaty and Tributaries, H.R.
Doc. 531, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1950).
8. Krutilla, op. cit. supra note 5, at 7.
9. U.S. Corps of Engineers, Water Resource Development of the Columbia
River 33 (1958). The Corps of Engineers has also considered the reduction of the
1894 flood to 600,000 cubic feet per second at the Dalles. This would require about
30 million acre-feet of storage. Id. at 34.
10. Krutilla, op. cit. supra note 5, at 8.
11. For discussions of problems of developing upstream storage in the Columbia
River Basin in the United States, see Marts, Upstream Storage Problems in Columbia
River Po.,er Development, 44 Annals of the Ass'n of American Geographers 43
(1954); Marts, The Middle Snake River Controversy, Water Power, January, 1961,
pp. 23-27.
12. The Canadian reference note is reproduced in Canadian Dep't of External
Affairs, The Columbia River Treaty, Protocol, and Related Documents 17 (1964).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 4

Columbia River Basin."' 13 Any of these schemes would produce
over 16 million kilowatts of prime power, and would require over
50 million acre-feet of storage.
The report revealed that there are opportunities for developing
upwards of 23 million acre-feet of storage in the Canadian part of
the basin. Possibilities for head development in Canada, however,
are quite limited. Storage development in Canada, therefore, hinges
largely on whether the United States is willing to provide the necessary incentive.
B. The Principle of Downstream Benefit Sharing
Various incentives were proposed. The first was compensation
for the lands which would be flooded by the reservoirs in Canada.
This approach was probably based on the principle in the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty which states that a country can use in its
territory the waters which flow across the boundary, providing that
claimants in the other country who are injured are entitled to the
same compensation that an injured party in the country using the
water would have.14 The Canadians, led by General McNaughton,
Chairman of the Canadian Section of the International Joint Commission, realized that compensation for land flooded by the reservoirs understated the value of the storage. Its real value was in the
extra power that could be generated downstream and in the reduction of flood damages that it made posible. And so the principle of
downstream benefits was born. This was a new concept in the development of international rivers in North America. The notion
of compensation for damages was replaced by one of sharing of
benefits of development.
Canada claimed a share of the benefits. At first the Americans
were unmoved by this claim. It was thought that Canada would
have to develop the Columbia River eventually, and that all the
United States had to do was wait, and then collect storage benefits
free of charge. Two events, however, changed American thinking
13. International Columbia River Engineering Board; Water Resources of the
Columbia River Basin 9 (1959).
14. Article II of Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, January 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909) states in part:
it is agreed that any interference with or diversion from their natural chan-

nel of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury
on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle
the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in
the country where such diversion or interference occurs . . ..
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in this connection. First, Canada threatened to divert the Columbia
River into the Fraser River; second, British Columbia announced
plans for developing the Peace River in northern British Columbia.
It is difficult to assess the impact of the diversion threat. Certainly
it did not result in any immediate action on the part of the Americans to persuade Canada that non-diversion was more profitable.
Many Americans did not take it seriously, for they were aware that
diversion would probably harm the Fraser River fishery. They
thought, therefore, that the Canadian government would be unwilling to sanction such a scheme.' 5
The announcement of plans to develop the Peace River, however,
certainly was taken seriously by the Americans. In fact, it is probable that this announcement was the most important single event
in the course of the negotiations relating to the Columbia River.
It was now clear that Canada might not develop the Columbia
River, and that she would have to be given a positive incentive in
order to encourage her to do so. Doubtless it was this announcement that led to official recognition of Canada's right to downstream benefits in January, 1959.'"
C. Determinationand Allocation of Downstream Benefits
The problem then became one of finding a mutually acceptable
method for determining the magnitude of the downstream benefits
and finding a formula for allocating these benefits between the
United States and Canada. Unfortunately, the International Columbia River Engineering Board Report provided no guidance on
these matters. 7 The report assumed, for example, that all the
projects would be built simultaneously. This simplified the studies
but failed to recognize a most important factor in hydroelectric
power planning: the first storage added to a system is the most
valuable. The first one million acre-feet of storage results in a much
greater increase in prime power than does the second million acrefeet of storage. The aim, therefore, is to build the most economic
15. For a discussion of the Columbia-Fraser diversion proposals see Senator
Neuberger's testimony in Hearings on Upper Columbia Rivjer Development Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1956).
16. See Phillips, U.S. Concedes Power Point, Vancouver Province, January 30,
1959, p. 3.
17. In its terms of reference to the International Columbia River Engineering
Board, the International Joint Commission instructed the Board not to apportion costs
and benefits for projects which might be developed co-operatively between Canada
and the United States.
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projects first. In this way net benefits (or profits) are maximized. 8
Unfortunately, the International Columbia River Engineering
Board Report does not indicate which are the most economic projects. It indicates only that the schemes as a whole are economically
feasible in the sense that total benefits exceed total costs. Only with
an incremental analysis would it be possible to determine the most
economic components of these schemes.
The International Joint Commission was then requested to recommend a set of principles for determining and allocating downstream benefits. It made its recommendations in December, 1959," °
and these principles formed the basis for the negotiations for the
Columbia River Treaty which was signed in January, 1961.
The principles recommended by the International Joint Commission have been criticized on grounds of both economic principle
and equity. They are in fact a compromise between economics and
practicality. They recommended, for example, that each country
should build its own facilities, and then share the resulting power
and floor control benefits equally. This principle has been severely
criticized in Canada, particularly by economists.20 They claim that
it fails to recognize that one partner is investing far more in
the program than the other and yet is getting the same share of
the benefits. Canada would be paying about $400 million and the
United States about $130 million.2" A much more equitable formula
would be one which ensured that benefits were shared in proportion
to the costs.
The major difficulty, however, is the determination of the costs
of each partner. Canada's costs are readily identifiable because they
are new costs. In the case of the United States, however, there is
18. See Krutilla, Sequence and Timing in River Basin Development (Resources for
the Future, Inc., 1960).
19. International Joint Commission, Principles for Determining and Apportioning
Benefits from Co-operative Use of Storage Waters and Electrical Inter-connection
within the Columbia River System (1959).
20. See, e.g., Higgins, Columbia River Treaty: A Critical Review, 16 International
J. 390 (1961).
21. To enjoy the benefits provided by 15.5 million acre-feet of storage in Canada,
Canada would have to build three projects costing a total of $394.4 million. The
United States would have to build additional downstream generating facilities to take
full advantage of the storage releases. These facilities, together with the necessary
transmission lines, would cost about $130 million. The Libby project, which is not involved in benefit sharing, would cost the United States $322.9 million. See United
States Negotiators, Report to the Governments of the United States and Canada
(1960). It should be noted that estimates of costs of development have increased considerably since then. The most recent estimate available suggests costs in Canada would
total $450 million.
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considerable debate as to which are the relevant costs. The United
States negotiators argued that their country had already invested
over $2.7 billion in installations on the Columbia River, and that
the existence of these installations made possible the realization of
the downstream benefits. Canadian economists have argued, however, that previously incurred costs (historic costs) are irrelevant:
only new, incremental costs should be counted. They recognized,
nevertheless, that some of the present installations had been built
to take advantage of future availability of storage, but had not
been used so far. 22 Costs of such non-used facilities might be referred to as "attributed costs" and might properly be regarded as
part of the incremental costs of adding new capacity. No agreement
was reached, however, on how much of the costs of present installations could properly be charged as "attributed costs." Therefore,
the principle of each country bearing the costs of development in
its own country with a 50-50 sharing of benefits was accepted.
II
THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY

The Columbia River Treaty was signed in January, 1961, by
Prime Minister Diefenbaker and President Eisenhower. It calls for
the provision of 15.5 million acre-feet of storage in Canada at
three projects to be constructed within nine years of ratification of
the Treaty. 23 The storage at these three projects will be operated

to increase generation at plants downstream in the United States'
part of the basin and to reduce flood hazards there. The United
States agreed to operate the existing 24 downstream installations,
and all future installations, in such a way as to take maximum advantage of the storage regulation provided by Canada.2 4 The power
25
benefits of the Treaty projects are to be shared on a 50-50 basis.
At the time of the signing of the Treaty it was estimated that these
benefits would amount to a total of 2.6 million
kilowatts of capacity
26
and 13 billion kilowatt hours of energy.
22. Provision has been made at the Chief Joseph project, for example, for the

installation of
23. Treaty
sources of the
reproduced in

additional units, once storage is made available.
with Canada relating to Co-operative Development of the Water ReColumbia River Basin, hereinafter cited as "Columbia River Treaty,"
Canadian Dep't of External Affairs, op. cit. supra note 12, at 58.

24. Columbia River Treaty, op. cit. supra note 23, art. III, para 1.
25. Columbia River Treaty, op. cit. supra note 23, art. V, para. 1.
26. These benefits were calculated on the basis of a twenty-year period of streamflow records. More recently studies have been undertaken using a thirty-year period.
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Under the terms of the Treaty, about 8.5 million acre-feet of the

15.5 million acre-feet of storage provided by Canada will be used
for flood control purposes. For this Canada will receive payments
when each facility begins operation totaling $64 million.2 7 In addition, Canada agrees to provide other storage on an "on call" basis
in the event of special emergencies. The United States will pay
Canada $1,875,000 for each of the first four calls, plus compensation for any power losses .2 The flood control provisions of the
Treaty will continue after the sixty-year period of the Treaty is
terminated.29 After that time the United States will pay operating
costs involved for any call that is made, plus compensation for any
power losses.30
Under the Treaty agreement the United States has the option to
commence construction of the Libby project within five years after
the Treaty goes into effect. 1 Canada will pay the costs of clearing
the part of the reservoir that is located in Canada. These costs
will amount to about $13 million.3 2 The Libby project will make
possible the generation of an additional 550,000 kilowatts of prime
power in the United States. This will not be shared with Canada.
Canada will be able to increase prime power capacity of the West
Kootenay power plants by 200,000 kilowatts.3 This increase will
be retained by Canada.
Canada is permitted to divert the Kootenay River into the Columbia River after twenty years. 3 4 After that time up to 1.5 million
These reveal that power benefits larger by fourteen to eighteen per cent would be
available. Protocol, para 8; Background Paper, reproduced in Canadian Dep't of
External Affairs, op. cit. rupra note 12, at 132.
27. Columbia River Treaty, op. cit. supra note 23, art. VI, para. 1.
28. Columbia River Treaty, op. cit. supra note 23, art. VI, para. 3.
29. Columbia River Treaty, op. cit. supra note 23, art. IV, para. 3; art. VI, paras.
4, 5 ; art. XIX, para. 4.
30. Columbia River Treaty, op. cit. supra note 23, art. VI, para. 4.
31. Columbia River Treaty, op. cit. supra note 23, art. XII, para. 1.
32. Vancouver Province, Special Issue on the Columbia River Treaty, January 24,
1963, p. 2.
33. The British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority has been designated as the
Canadian entity to undertake development of the Columbia River in Canada. It will
be responsible for clearing the part of the Libby reservioir that is located in Canada.
Releases from Libby reservoir will be of direct benefit to the West Kootenay Power
and Light Company which has plants on the Kootenay River. Arrangements have yet
to be worked out between the British Columbia Hydro and the West Kootenay Power
and Light Company for compensation for clearing of the Libby reservoir. See the
agreements between Canada and British Columbia dated July 8, 1963, and January
13, 1964, reproduced in Canadian Dep't of External Affairs, op. cit. supra note 12, at
100, 107.
34. Columbia River Treaty, op. cit. supra note 23, art. XIII, para. 2.
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acre-feet per year may be diverted. Diversion of the Columbia
River into the Fraser River, however, is not permitted during the
5
life of the Treaty.
III
BRITISH COLUMBIA--OTTAWA RELATIONS

The Treaty was ratified almost immediately by the United States
Senate but has still to be ratified by the Canadian government.
The main reason for the delay has been the lack of entente between
the British Columbia government and the federal government at
Ottawa. Under the terms of the British North America Act of
1867, the provinces are granted ownership of resources within
their boundaries.36 The federal government, however, is given
jurisdiction over certain uses of those resources. In the case of water
resources the federal government has jurisdiction over navigable
streams, inter-provincial waters, and international waters.37 In
addition, treaty-making powers are an inherent federal function.
Such an arrangement makes it essential that there be an entente
between the federal and provincial government in matters relating
to the development of international streams. The provincial government can propose developments on such streams but cannot
implement them without federal sanction. On the other hand, the
federal authority can make treaties with the United States relating
to river development but cannot easily implement them without
provincial co-operation.
4. The Kaiser Deal
The necessary entente between British Columbia and Ottawa,
however, was not easily established, and for a time it seemed that
the federal government at Ottawa was having more difficulty in
bargaining with British Columbia than it was in bargaining with
35. Columbia River Treaty, ot. cit. supra note 23, art XIII, para. 1, states:
Except as provided in this Article neither Canada nor the United States
of America shall, without the consent of the other evidenced by an exchange
of notes, divert for any use, other than consumptive use, any water from
its natural channel in a way that alters the flow of any water as it crosses
the Canada-United States of America boundary within the Columbia River
basin.
Other paragraphs of the Article provide for diversions of the Kootenay River, under
specified conditions.
36. British North America Act, 1867, 30 Vict., c. 3, §§ 92(10), (13), (16).
37. British North America Act, 1867, 30 Vict., c. 3, §§ 91(10), (12), (29), 132.
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the United States. Disagreement between Ottawa and British
Columbia dates back to 1955 when the federal government blocked
a proposed agreement between the British Columbia government
and the Kaiser Aluminum Company for the development of
storage on Arrow Lakes. Kaiser Aluminum had offered to build
a $30 million dam to regulate flows from Arrow Lakes. This project
would have resulted in the addition of 331,000 kilowatts of prime
power to the United States system. Kaiser had proposed that one
half of this would be made available to the Bonneville Power Administration, and the other half would be used for its own purposes
and to compensate British Columbia. The Canadian federal government, however, responded by passing the International River Improvements Act which requires federal approval of works constructed on international rivers. It reasoned that studies of the Columbia River in Canada were not yet complete, and until they were
complete it would be impossible to judge the long run merits of the
proposed Kaiser deal.
B. Sale of Downstream Benefits
The main point of disagreement, however, between the federal
government and the British Columbia government was over the
disposal of downstream benefits. Mr. Bennett, the Premier of British Columbia, has consistently maintained since 1961 that his Province's share of the downstream benefits of Columbia River development should be sold to the United States. The federal govvernment, on the other hand, remained adamant that they should
be returned to Canada as they were held to be the cheapest source
of power available to British Columbia. The federal government,
therefore, continued to maintain its ban on the export of electric
power.
Mr. Bennett, however, was in a very strategic position. He realized that development of the water resources of British Columbia
could not easily take place without his consent. Canada, on the other
hand, had signed a Treaty with the United States and was running
the risk of international embarrassment if she did not ratify it. It
was suggested that the way out of the dilemma was for the federal
government to build the projects itself as a work for the "general
Advantage of Canada," a step that was possible under the provisions of the British North America Act. 38 It seems unlikely that
38. Under the terms of the British North America Act, the federal authority may
undertake

OCTOBER, 19641

COLUMBIA RIPER TREATY

the federal government would have invoked this provision, particularly as it might have appeared as a usurpation of provincial
autonomy. 39 In any event, Mr. Bennett acted swiftly, and pulled
the rug from beneath the federal government's feet. He expropriated the British Columbia Electric Company and the Peace River
Power Company. 40 He thus provided a power market for the Peace
River project, and at the same time precluded the use of downstream benefit power in British Columbia.
C. Expropriationof the British Columbia Electric Company
The British Columbia Electric Company was an investor-owned
utility, serving the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, the largest
power market in the province. This company, however, had shown
only limited interest in power from the Peace River, and had indicated that it had cheaper alternative sources, such as thermal power
Such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are before
or after their execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the
general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of the
Provinces.
British North America Act, 1867, 30 Vict., c. 3, § 92(10) (c).
39. The extent to which the federal government might go without provincial cooperation is a matter which is open to debate. Clearly, it would depend on the circumstances of the individual case. Nevertheless, there is a great respect for provincial
autonomy. See e.g., the ruling of the Privy Council in Attorney-General Canada v.
Attorney-General Ontario, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673, 682-84:
In other words the Dominion cannot merely by making promises to foreign
countries, clothe itself with legislative authority inconsistent with the constitution which gave it birth.
It must not be thought that the result of this decision is that Canada is
incompetent to legislate in performance of treaty obligations. In totality of
legislative powers, Dominion and provincial together, she is fully equipped.
But the legislative powers remain distributed and if in the exercise of her new
functions derived from her new international status Canada incurs obligations,
they must, so far as legislation be concerned, when they deal with provincial
classes of subjects, be dealt with by the totality of powers, in other words,
by co-operation between the Dominion and the Provinces.
40. Vancouver Sun, August 1, 1961, p. 1. The expropriation resulted in a long
and complicated legal battle between the former owners and the British Columbia
government regarding the validity of the legislation under which the expropriation
was undertaken, and the adequacy of the compensation offered for the power companies' assets. The legislation was declared ultra vires by Chief Justice Sherwood Lett
of the British Columbia Supreme Court on July 30, 1963. Subsequently, the British
Columbia government came to terms with the British Columbia Power Corporation, the
parent company of the British Columbia Electric Co., and offered to increase compensation from $171 million to $192 million. The Power Corporation accepted the
offer. The government also paid $8 million for the assets of the Peace River Power
Co. For an outline of the legal battle see Vancouver Sun, July 30, 1963, pp. 1-3, and
August 1, 1963, pp. 1-3.
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based on coal from the Hat Creek deposits. With an embargo on
the export of power, and with no immediate market in the Lower
Mainland, it is probable that the Peace River project would have
been shelved, for the time being at least. The provincial government, however, was anxious that the Peace River project should
go ahead, particularly as it was regarded as a key element in a
program for the development of the northern part of the province.
The provincial government expropriated both the British Columbia Electric Company and the Peace River Power Company. The
latter company had been formed to carry out the development of
the Peace River. The expropriation brought both companies under
the control of a newly-formed agency, the British Columbia Power
Corporation (which subsequently was merged with the British
Columbia Power Commission to form the present British Columbia
Hydro and Power Authority). The Peace River project was thus
guaranteed the Lower Mainland market. Power from the Columbia
River, therefore, would be surplus for at least twenty years.
D. The Canada-BritishColumbia Agreement
The federal government had no alternative but to reverse its
policy of non-export of electric power from Canada. Once this reversal had been formally announced, the British Columbia government and the federal government resumed negotiations. An agreement between the two governments concerning the development of
the Columbia River was signed in July, 1963."' With a united front
thus assured, the federal government resumed talks with the United
States.
Meanwhile, there had been a number of criticisms of the Treaty
in Canada,42 particularly during the federal and provincial election
campaigns. The New Democratic Party (popularly known as the
NDP) claimed that the Treaty was a sell-out to the United States
and that it should be scrapped. The Liberal Party, which was
elected to office at Ottawa shortly afterwards, suggested that some
of its provisions should be modified. The federal government thus
had the benefit of these criticisms when it resumed negotiations with
the United States in the latter part of 1963. These negotiations resulted in a Protocol Agreement between Canada and the United
States which was signed in Washington, D.C., in January of this
41. Reproduced in Canadian Dep't of External Affairs, op. cit. supra note 12, at
100.
42. See, e.g., Higgins, op. cit. supra note 20; General A. G. L. McNaughton, The
Proposed Columbia River Treaty, 18 International J. 148 (1962-1963).
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year.4" This Agreement has been attached to the Treaty as a Protocol Note.
IV
THE PROTOCOL AGREEMENT

The Protocol Agreement removes some of the objections that
were raised in Canada about the terms of the original Treaty. First,
it makes it clear that Canada wishes to dispose of her share of the
downstream benefits to the United States, and it establishes the
terms of this sale." Under the Agreement the United States will
pay Canada a lump sum of $274.8 million (Canadian) for Canada's
share of the downstream benefits during the first thirty years of the
sixty-year Treaty, plus $69.6 million (Canadian) for flood control
benefits. 4 5 Invested at five per cent these sums would accumulate
to over $500 million by 1973. This will make it possible for
Canada to build the three Treaty projects, and to have enough
left over to pay half the cost of the generators for the Mica project.
It will make possible the delivery of about twenty billion kilowatt
hours of energy annually in the Vancouver area at a total cost of
less than three mills per kilowatt hour-about half the present cost
of generation in that area.46
The Agreement also eliminates the objection that the original
Treaty removed control of the Canadian portion of the River from
Canadian hands. Generators will be installed eventually at Mica,
and probably at Downie, and also at Revelstoke Canyon. Canada
wanted to ensure that maximum use would be made of the head
available at these sites. The Protocol permits Canada to decide
which reservoirs shall provide the releases required for downstream power benefits in the United States.17 Under the Treaty,
43. The Columbia River Treaty, the Canada-British Columbia Agreement, the
Protocol Agreement, an Abstract of the International Columbia River Engineering
Board Report, and the Report of the International Joint Commission on Principles
for Determining and Apportioning Benefits from Co-operative Use of Storage of
Waters and Electrical Interconnection within the Columbia River System, are set
out in Canadian Dep't of External Affairs, op. cit. supra note 12, at 100.
44. Protocol, para. 3, id. at 112; Attachment Relating to Terms of Sale, id. at 117.
45. Id. at 118. Expressed in United States dollars, payments for power benefits
would amount to $254.4 million, and those for flood control, $64.4 million. If Canada
elects to sell her share of the downstream benefits after the thirty year period, payments by the United States would average between $5 and $10 million annually
after 1994. Id. at 155.
46. Id. at 178-79.

47. Protocol, para. 7(2), id. at 113.
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the United States may call upon Canada for flood control in addition to the 8.5 million acre-feet provided at Mica, Arrow Lakes,
and Duncan for flood control purposes. 4 8 It may do so, however,
only in emergency situations, when the flow at the Dalles exceeds
600,000 cubic feet per second. The Protocol makes it clear that
the United States may make such calls only if all available storage
in the United States portion of the basin has been used.4 This will
ensure that Canadian power production is not unreasonably impaired by emergency calls.
The original Treaty provides for the construction of the Libby
project. It was unclear, however, how beneficial its regulation would
be for Canadian plants on the Kootenay River. The Protocol Agreement calls for the co-ordination of the operation of the Libby
project with the operations of the Canadian plants to the extent
that it is not to the disadvantage of the United States. °
Another important modification is that Canada may divert water
from the basin at any time for irrigation or domestic and industrial
purposes. 51 This provision overcomes objections raised by the government of Saskatchewan that the Prairie provinces are becoming
dangerously short of water, and that flows of the Columbia River
should be diverted to the Saskatchewan River for irrigation and
domestic supply purposes rather than utilized in the United States
for power purposes. However, it seems unlikely, at least within
the foreseeable future, that Canada will take advantage of this
provision. There are much cheaper ways of augmenting water supplies in the Prairie provinces than diverting flows from the Columbia
River system into the Saskatchewan River system.a
The Protocol Agreement also removes the requirement that
Canada pay the United States for providing standby service for the
53
Canadian share of the downstream benefits during the sale period.
48. Protocol, para. 1(1), id. at 111.
49. Ibid.
50. Protocol, para. 5, id. at 113.
51. Protocol, para. 6, id. at 113. The United States is accorded the same right.
52. In a preliminary study of the possibilities of diverting water from the Columbia River basin into the Saskatchewan-Nelson River basin, the Crippen Wright Engineering Company, Ltd., estimated that water diverted from the Columbia River
basin would cost $10.50 per acre-foot delivered to the South Saskatchewan reservoir.
Water diverted from the Athabaska River, however, would cost only $3.50 per acrefoot delivered to the same point, and water diverted from the Peace River would
cost $4.60 per acre-foot. See Canadian Dep't of External Affairs, The Columbia River
Treaty and Protocol: a Presentation (1964).
53. Protocol, para. 4, in Canadian Dep't of External Affairs, the Columbia River
Treaty, Protocol, and Related Documents 112 (1964).
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Since these benefits will be retained in the United States, such
standby service will not be required. This elimination will save
Canada up to $2 million per annum.
Finally, the Protocol Agreement states that the Treaty shall not
be regarded as a precedent. 4 This leaves Canada and the United
States free to negotiate appropriate terms for the development of
other rivers which they share, such as the Yukon and the St. John.
V
OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY

The Treaty was debated in the Canadian House of Commons
and was discussed in detail in the Standing Committee on External
Affairs. The Treaty was supported by the Government party (the
Liberals) 5 5 and the Social Credit Party. It received some comments
but no serious criticism from the Conservative Party, under whose
administration the Treaty was originally drawn up. It was severely
criticized, however, by the New Democratic Party (NDP).
A. The McNaughton Plan
The New Democratic Party proposed that the Treaty be scrapped
and that an alternative scheme be adopted which would permit the
development of a greater amount of storage and head in the Canadian portion of the basin. The scheme which they proposed has
come to be known as the "McNaughton Plan." It is based on a
scheme recommended by General McNaughton, the former Chairman of the Canadian Section of the International Joint Commission.
Its basic difference from the Treaty plan is that it diverts the
Kootenay River into the Columbia River rather than allowing the
Kootenay to flow in its natural course as in the Treaty Plan. To
accomplish this the McNaughton Plan would substitute the DorrBull River project for the Libby project, and a low dam at Arrow
Lakes for the proposed high dam there (Figure 2).
Several advantages have been claimed for the McNaughton Plan
over the Treaty scheme. The McNaughton Plan would increase
power production from the Canadian portion of the basin by at
least ten per cent over that estimated in the Treaty scheme." It
54. Protocol, para. 12, id. at 114.
55. The federal government's position on the Columbia River Treaty is set forth

in Canadian Dep't of External Affairs, The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol: a
Presentation (1964).

56. Id. at 67.

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 4

FIGURE 2
ALTERNATIVE PLANS FOR COLUMBIA
RIVER DEVELOPMENT

would improve the economic feasibility of the Mica project by providing storage to compensate for releases at Mica. It would however, eliminate the Libby project and therefore preclude the development of two sites immediately downstream from the Libby
project, Katka and Kootenay Falls. Furthermore, substitution of
the McNaughton Plan for the Treaty scheme would no doubt have
required Canada to compensate for loss of at-site power production
from the Libby project.
General McNaughton claimed that the diversion scheme would
provide regulation of the Upper Kootenay and Columbia at lesser
cost than the Treaty Scheme."7 The Dorr-Bull River projects would
57. See General A. G. L. McNaughton, op. cit. supra note 42, at 161.
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provide less at-site power than the Libby project, but would result
in comparable downstream benefit6. The major advantage as seen
by the General is that much of these downstream benefits would be
generated in Canada rather than in the United States.
There has been a good deal of disagreement as to the costs of
the McNaughton scheme, and the data presented so far do not permit any firm conclusions as to relative economic feasibility."' In
any event, development of the McNaughton Plan was precluded by
the decision of the British Columbia government to ban any inundation by hydroelectric power schemes in the East Kootenay Valley.
This is presently an agricultural region. It appears to have considerable potential, however, as a recreational area. The diversion
scheme would inundate several thousand acres of critical grazing
area for big game, as well as large areas of waterfowl habitat. It
would require relocation of transportation media and the removal
and rehabilitation of over 1500 people.5" Equally important was the
fact that the United States negotiators were not especially anxious
to give up the Libby project. It had already reached an advanced
stage of engineering design and there appeared to be political support for its development.
B. The High Arrow Project
The inclusion of the High Arrow Dam also gave rise to opposition to the Treaty. Opponents of the Treaty pointed out that the
High Arrow project would result in only minor power production
in Canada, and would inundate a number of small communities and
several thousand acres of agricultural land. They suggested that the
McNaughton scheme would not only provide the same function as
the High Arrow project, but would, also make possible greater
power production in the Canadian part of the basin, as well as
avoiding inundation in the Arrow Lakes area.
One of the Principles recommended by the International Joint
Commission for the Determination and Allocation of Downstream
Benefits was that the most profitable projects should be built first.
The High Arrow project was found to b¢ the most profitable of all
the projects considered by the Internatiohal Columbia River Engineering Board and by several firms of consulting engineers.6 ° More58. Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty: An International Evaluation 13 (Resources for the Future, Inc., 1963).
59. Canadian Dep't of External Affairs, The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol: a Presentation 50 (1964).
60. Id. at 69.
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over, the inundation caused by the High Arrow project would be
far less than that caused by the- McNaughton scheme. The High
Arrow project would inundate 5,000 acres of agricultural land. Only
a part of this, however, is presently cultivated because farming has
become progressively less profitable in the area, and it seems that
there is little likelihood of any change in this situation in the foreseeable future. 61 Those residents whose homes and lands will be
inundated by the High Arrow project will be compensated for the
losses involved.
C. Flood Control Payments
There was also criticism of the amount of flood control payments
which Canada is to receive. General McNaughton suggests that the
$70 million (Canadian) lump sum called for in the Treaty is far
below the amount Canada should rightfully receive. 62 He noted that
the flood control benefits on which the lump sum payment is based
represent the value of protection against losses from floods up to
the magnitude of an 1894 flood. He pointed out, however, that the
Treaty projects will provide control of much larger floods than the
1894 flood and claimed that this should have been recognized in the
calculations. He claimed further that under the terms of the Treaty
the United States will be paying the equivalent of $16 per acre-foot
of storage for flood control purposes, whereas the United States
would have to pay $24 per acre-foot for comparable storage in
the United States part of the basin. For these reasons, General
McNaughton claimed that the lump sum payment to Canada should
be substantially increased.
Many of the General's arguments on this point, however, can be
refuted. First, the fact that Canadian storage capacity can provide
additional flood control is recognized in the Treaty, and arrangements are set out for emergency calls on this capacity. Canada will
be compensated for such additional calls. Second, whether the
United States would have to pay $24 or $50 per acre-foot for
comparable storage really begs the question. Storage may be available at $24 per acre-foot, but this is no guarantee that it would be
developed.
In any event, it is probable that the benefits of Canadian storage
were over-valued rather than under-valued. The method used for
calculating the benefits considered all storage used in reducing
61. Id. at 71.
62. See Vancouver Province, Special Issue on the Columbia River Treaty, op. cit.
supra note 32, at 4.
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potential floods to the level of 800,000 cubic feet per second at the
Dalles to be of equal value.6 3 Such an averaging of storage benefits
fails to recognize the basic principle that the value of each additional unit of storage diminishes as more storage is added.64 Had an
incremental approach been used, the value attributable to benefits
of Canadian storage probably would have been much less than
under the equal shares method used by the negotiators.
CONCLUSION

The unified approach to the development of international river
basins has much to recommend it. In particular, it generally makes
possible much greater net returns from the development of the basin
than could have been obtained through independent actions of the
various nations sharing it. Although the unified approach has been
successfully applied in several parts of the world in the development
of internal river basins,6 it has been applied to only a minor extent in the case of international rivers. 66 There are a few instances
where it has been applied at the planning stage, such as in the Lower
Mekong, 67 but there is not one example of an international river
developed on a completely unified basis. In many cases the reasons
for this are fairly obvious. Conflicting political ideologies, lack of
experience in river basin development, and intense competition for
the use of water are among the most common factors preventing
unified development. None of these, however, applied in the case
of the Columbia River.
The Columbia River offered an ideal opportunity for the development of an international river on a unified basis. Indeed, the initial
studies were undertaken from a basin-wide standpoint. The Treaty
which has emerged from the investigations and negotiations, however, falls short of a completely unified approach.
With a unified approach projects would have been selected on the
basis of their maximizing net benefits from the use of the River.
63. Canadian Dep't of External Affairs The Columbia River Treaty: a Presentation 88 (1964).
64. See Krutilla, Sequence and Timing in River Basin Development (Resources
for the Future, Inc., 1960).
65. G. White, .4 Perspective of River Basin Development, 22 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 157 (1957).
66. United Nations, Integrated River Basin Development 32-43 (1958).
67. For discussions of progress and problems in planning the development of the
Lower Mekong River, see Schaff & Fifield, the Lower Mekong: Challenge to Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1963); G. White, The Mekong River Plan, Scientific
American, April 1963, pp. 49-59.
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Evidence suggests, however, that selection was not made on this
basis, and Various non-economic factors played a cardinal role in
determining which projects were to be included in the Treaty.6 It
is likely, therefore, that less than optimum use of the River will
result from the Treaty scheme.
Nevertheless, the Treaty clearly benefits both countries, since
it facilitates the development of a resource (the Upper Columbia
River) which otherwise would have remained undeveloped. Canadian storage is apparently cheaper than American storage, and
therefore the Treaty arrangements are of advantage to the United
States. On the other hand, without United States participation it
is unlikely that Canada would have developed the Upper Columbia,
since there are cheaper alternatives than independent Canadian
development of the Columbia River. The Treaty provided Canada
with the opportunity to buy into a going concern in the United
States. In addition, the lump sum payments called for under the
Protocol Agreement will furnish British Columbia with investment
capital for economic development in the immediate future. At a
later stage she will be able to enjoy the benefits of power generation
on the Columbia River in Canada as well as downstream benefits
from generation in the United States part of the basin.
How much larger the benefits might have been with a completely
unified approach to development, however, and whether the relative
shares from co-operative development are equitable, will remain
matters of continued speculation. Satisfactory answers can only be
provided by a complete economic evaluation of the benefits and
costs of various possible schemes for developing the Columbia
River. Unfortunately, neither the tools nor the data are available
to undertake such an evaluation. Considerable progress has been
made in the past ten years in developing a framework for the economic analysis of river basin schemes."' There remains substantial
disagreement, however, both as to concepts underlying the analysis,
and as to techniques for measuring benefits and costs. 70 Much more
68. Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty: an International Evaluation 13 (Resources for the Future, Inc., 1963).
69. See, e.g., Krutilla & Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River Development (1958)
Eckstein, Water-resource Development (1958); McKean, Efficiency in Government
through Systems Analysis (1958); Maas, Dorfman, et al., Design of Water Resource
Systems (1962). See also Hirschleifer, de Haven, & Milliman, Water Supply: Economics, Technology, and Policy (1960).
70. For a concise discussion of problems of cbncepts and techniques of measurement, see Kneese & Nobe, The Role of Economic Evaluation in Planning for Water
Resource De'velopment, 2 Natural Resources J. 445 (1962).
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research is required before completely satisfactory principles and
procedures for economic analysis of river development projects
can be agreed upon. Until such principles and procedures are available, however, it is impossible to determine whether the proposals
for international development of the Columbia River are consistent
with net benefit maximization, nor can we judge whether one arrangement is more "equitable" than another.
TABLE I
COLUMBIA RIVER
GENERAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

General Data
Source of the Columbia River
Mouth of the Columbia River
Length in Miles
Drainage Area in Square Miles
Total Fall of River in Feet
Average Annual Runoff in Millions of
Acre-Feet

Canada
Columbia Lake
480
39,500
1,360
73

U.S.A.
Astoria, Ore.
740
219,500
1,290
107

TABLE II
TREATY PROJECTS

Project
Location
Drainage Area
Average Flow
Max. Recorded Flow
Min. Recorded Flow
Dam Height
Live Storage

Arrow Lakes
5 mles
upstream from
Castlegar
14,000 sq.
miles
39,800 cfs
220,000 cfs
4,800 cfs
190 ft.
7.1 million
acre-feet

Duncan Lake
Outlet of
Duncan Lake
925 sq.
miles
3,600 cfs
21,400 cfs
268 cfs
120 ft.
6.4 million
acre-feet

Mica Creek
90 miles
upstream from
Revelstoke
8,220 sq.
miles
20,700 cfs
112,000 cfs
2,140 cfs
645 ft.
Stage 1.
Storage only:
7 million
acre-feet
Stage 2.
With at-site
gen. 12 million
acre-feet

